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STATEMENT QF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals is conferred with jurisdiction over 
the instant appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2) (e) 
(2002). 
STATEMENT QF ISSUES / STANDARDS QF REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion by 
allowing the State to introduce evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior 
drug conviction, wrongs, or bad acts. The trial court's decision 
to admit or reject evidence of prior crimes, wrongs or acts is 
reviewed by the appellate court for abuse of discretion. State v. 
Allen, 2005 UT 11, Hl5, 108 P.3d 730; State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 
57, 1Jl8, 993 P.2d 837. However, because such a decision is a 
mixed question of law and fact, the admission of prior crimes, 
wrongs or acts "must be scrupulously examined by trial judges in 
the proper exercise of that discretion." Id. (citation omitted). 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Ms. Reddish preserved this issue by way of her counsel's 
objections and arguments set forth at R. 210:211 and R. 210:213-
14. 
2. "Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal 
duty to resolve on the record the accuracy of contested 
information in sentencing reports is a question of law that [the 
1 
appellate court] review[s] for correctness." State v. Veteto, 
2000 UT 62, Hl3, 6 P.3d 1133. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review. 
Ms. Reddish preserved this issue by way of her objection set forth 
at page 34-35 of the 03/17/05 Sentencing Transcript. 
3. Whether appointed trial counsel denied Ms. Reddish of 
the Sixth Amendment right to the effective assistance of counsel 
by failing to request that the trial court utilize its fact 
finding function to resolve the inaccuracy in the presentence 
investigation report. To make such a showing, a defendant must 
show, first, that counsel rendered a deficient performance, 
falling below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment, and, second, that counsel's performance was prejudicial. 
Bundy v. DeLand, 763 P.2d 803 (Utah 1988) . The appellate court 
reviews such a claim as a matter of law. State v. Maestas, 1999 
UT 32, H20, 984 P.2d 376. 
Preservation of Issue Citation or Statement of Grounds for Review: 
Issues involving claims of ineffective assistance of counsel 
constitute an exception to the preservation rule and as such may 
be raised for the first time on appeal. 
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DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
The constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, 
regulations, or case law whose interpretation is determinative, 
are set out verbatim, with the appropriate citation, in the body 
and arguments of the instant Brief of Appellant. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case involves the failure of the trial court to properly 
analyze the elicited testimony and presentation of evidence of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction under Utah Rule of Evidence 
404 (b) . Moreover, this case involves the failure by both the 
trial court and appointed trial counsel to deal appropriately with 
an inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report brought to 
the court's attention in a timely manner. These failures at 
sentencing precluded Ms. Reddish of a fair sentencing hearing. 
The State charged Ms. Reddish with one count of Possession or 
Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-degree felony, in 
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (2) (a) (i) , one count of 
Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a class A 
misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-8(2) (a) (i) , one 
count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class B misdemeanor, 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l), and one count of 
Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, a class B. 
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Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44. Ms. 
Reddish appeared before the district court and pleaded not guilty. 
Ms. Reddish appeared for a jury trial, during which she 
testified in her own behalf. The jury, upon the conclusion of 
trial, deliberated for less than an hour and a half, after which 
it convicted Ms. Reddish as charged. 
The trial court referred Ms. Reddish to the Adult Parole and 
Probation Department for a presentence investigation report. At 
sentencing, newly appointed trial counsel informed the trial court 
of a discrepancy in the presentence investigation report. 
Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony, the trial court 
sentenced Ms. Reddish "to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison", 
which the trial court suspended. The trial court then sentenced 
Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail. The 
trial court also imposed the following sentences: (1) for the 
conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a class 
A misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 
365 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court 
suspended; (2) for the conviction of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced 
Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which 
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the trial court suspended; and (3) for the conviction of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol / Drugs, a class B Misdemeanor, the 
trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the 
Davis County Jail, which the trial court also suspended. The 
trial court placed Mr. Reddish on probation for three years. Ms. 
Reddish appealed. 
STATEMENT QF FACTS 
1. Ms. Reddish was charged with was charged with one count 
of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), a second-
degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2) (a) (i), 
one count of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance (Prior), 
a class A misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 58-37-
8(2) (a) (i) , one count of Possession of Drug Paraphernalia, a class 
B misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37a-5(l), and 
one count of Driving Under the Influence of Alcohol and/or Drugs, 
a class B. Misdemeanor, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 41-6-44 
(R. 86-87) . See Amended Information, R. 86-87, a true and correct 
copy of which is attached hereto as Addendum A. 
2. On June 10, 2004, Ms. Reddish appeared before the 
district court and pleaded not guilty (R. 19-20) . 
3. Ms. Reddish appeared for a jury trial on January 25, 
2005 (R. 88-90). 
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4. During the course of the trial, Ms. Reddish testified in 
her own behalf (R. 210:180-224). 
5. On cross-examination, the State elicited the following 
testimony from Ms. Reddish: 
Defendant: He never even told me what I was being 
arrested for, actually. 
Prosecutor: Okay. 
Defendant: I found out in jail. 
Prosecutor: But you did tell the officer that you 
had a pirior conviction for meth? Seven 
years -
Defendant: No, I did not. I never did. No. It's 
nothing I brag about. 
(R. 210:210:12-17). 
6. Defense counsel objected, arguing that the State's 
reference to Ms. Reddish's prior drug-related conviction was 
improper under Rule 404(b) of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 
210:210-11; 210:213-14). 
7. The trial court, after entertaining argument, ruled that 
the State's reference to the prior conviction was admissible 
because it goes to the intent of Ms. Reddish to possess the 
controlled substances found in her car (R. 210:215-16). In 
addition, the trial court concluded that "the probative value on 
the intent issue rises above the level of the prejudicial issue." 
(R. 210:215-16). 
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8. The jury, upon the conclusion of trial, deliberated for 
less than an hour and a half, after which it convicted Ms. Reddish 
as charged (R. 89; R. 121-22). 
9. The trial court referred Ms. Reddish to the Adult Parole 
and Probation Department for a presentence investigation report 
(R. 210:303:21-23). 
10. At sentencing, on March 17, 2005, newly appointed trial 
counsel informed the trial court of a discrepancy in the 
presentence investigation report (03/17/05 Sentencing Transcript, 
pp. 34-35). Ms. Reddish disputed the 11/26/83 conviction for 
possession / use of a controlled substance as set forth on page 5 
of the presentence investigation report. See R. 211, presentence 
investigation report, p. 5, section B, a true and correct copy of 
which is attached hereto as Addendum D. The alleged error was not 
discussed further. 
11. Based upon the conviction of Possession or Use of a 
Controlled Substance, a second-degree felony, the trial court 
sentenced Ms. Reddish "to an indeterminate term of not less than 
one year nor more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison", 
which the trial court suspended (R. 162) . See Sentence, Judgment, 
Commitment, R. 161-65, a true and correct copy of which is 
attached hereto as Addendum C. The trial court then sentenced 
Defendant to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail (Id.). 
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The trial court also imposed the following sentences: (1) for 
the conviction of Possession or Use of a Controlled Substance, a 
class A misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a 
term of 3 65 days in the Davis County Jail, which the trial court 
suspended; (2) for the conviction of Possession of Drug 
Paraphernalia, a class B Misdemeanor, the trial court sentenced 
Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the Davis County Jail, which 
the trial court suspended; and (3) for the conviction of Driving 
Under the Influence of Alcohol / Drugs, a class B Misdemeanor, the 
trial court sentenced Ms. Reddish to a term of 180 days in the 
Davis County Jail, which the trial court also suspended (Id.). 
The trial court placed Ms. Reddish on probation for three years 
(Id.). 
12. Ms. Reddish, through appointed appellate counsel, filed 
a timely Notice of Appeal on April 29, 2005 (R. 167-70). 
SUMMARY QF ARGUMENTS 
1. The trial court abused its discretion by allowing the 
State, in the course of cross-examination, to elicit and introduce 
evidence of Ms. Reddish's six or seven-year-old drug conviction, 
wrong, or bad act. The trial court abused its discretion by 
admitting evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior conviction for 
possession of meth. The record demonstrates that evidence of Ms. 
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Reddish's prior drug conviction was not offered for a non-
character purpose. Moreover, the prior drug conviction some six 
or seven years ago does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule 
of Evidence 4 02. 
The record also demonstrates that the evidence of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction was less than probative of any 
material fact to the crimes charged. Finally, the trial court 
erred by concluding that the evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior drug 
conviction met the requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of 
Evidence. 
2. The trial court erred by failing to determine on the 
record the accuracy of contested information contained in the 
presentence investigation report. The record demonstrates that 
the trial court failed to duly consider the inaccuracy set forth 
in the presentence investigation report. Further, the trial court 
failed to make a determination on the record of whether the 
information was relevant to the issue of sentencing. 
3. Appointed trial counsel denied Ms. Reddish of her Sixth 
Amendment Right to the effective assistance of counsel by failing 
to request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function 
to resolve the inaccuracy. Appointed trial counsel's failure to 
request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function to 
resolve the inaccuracy in the presentence investigation report 
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fell below an objective standard of reasonable professional 
judgment. But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to 
request that the trial court utilize its fact finding function, 
the result at sentencing would have been different. 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY ALLOWING 
THE STATE, IN THE COURSE OF CROSS-EXAMINATION, TO 
ELICIT AND INTRODUCE EVIDENCE OF MS. REDDISH'S SIX 
OR SEVEN-YEAR-OLD DRUG CONVICTION, WRONG, OR BAD 
ACT. 
A. Admissibility of Other Crimes, Wrongs or Acts 
Evidence Generally 
As a fundamental principle of law, a person may be convicted 
criminally only for his or her acts and not for his or her general 
character. State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, 1l5, 992 P.2d 951. 
This fundamental principle is violated "if a conviction is based 
on an inference that conviction is justified because of the 
defendant's criminal character or propensity to commit bad acts." 
Id. "The admission of evidence of prior crimes may have such a 
powerful tendency to mislead the finder of fact as to subvert the 
constitutional principle that a defendant may be convicted only if 
guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of a specific crime charged." 
Id. (citing In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364, 90 S. Ct. 1068 
(1970)). Hence, the law has long prohibited the admission of 
prior crime evidence unless the proffered evidence is probative of 
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an issue other than criminal propensity or character and is not 
unduly prejudicial. Id. "The rule limiting the admissibility of 
evidence of prior crimes, as presently stated in rule 404(b) of 
the Utah Rules of Evidence, has existed for almost a century in 
this state." Id. (string citation omitted). Although the Utah 
Supreme Court, in State v. Decorso, 1999 UT 57, KK12-35, " 3 p- 2 d 
837, addressed and limited prior statements of the rule 
articulated in State v. Doporto, 935 P.2d 484 (Utah 1997), "the 
basic concepts embodied in the rule limiting the use of prior 
crime evidence remain intact." Id. 
B. Rule 404(b) Analysis 
Utah Rule of Evidence 4 04 (b) governs the admission of 
evidence of other crimes, wrongs, and bad acts. Rule 404(b) 
provides: 
Evidence of other crimes, wrongs or acts is 
not admissible to prove the character of a 
person in order to show action in conformity 
therewith. It may, however, be admissible 
for other purposes, such as proof of motive, 
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, 
knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or 
accident . . . . 
Utah R. Evid. 4 04(b). Prior to deciding whether evidence of other 
crimes, wrongs, and bad acts is admissible under Rule 404(b), "the 
trial court must determine (1) whether such evidence is being 
offered for a proper, noncharacter purpose under 404(b), (2) 
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whether such evidence meets the requirements of rule 402, and (3) 
whether this evidence meets the requirements of rule 403." State 
v. Nelson-Waggoner, 2000 UT 59, fl6, 6 P.3d 1120 (citing State v. 
Decorso, 1999 UT 57, 1(21-22, 29, 993 P.2d 837). 
"A trial court's admission of evidence under rule 404(b) is 
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard." State v. Bluff, 
2002 UT 66, f56, 52 P. 3d 1210 (citing Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at 1fl8) . 
However, "admission of prior crimes evidence itself must be 
scrupulously examined by trial judges in the proper exercise of 
that discretion." Decorso, 1999 UT 57 at Ul8 (citation omitted). 
In the instant case, the State, during the cross-examination 
of Ms. Reddish, wrongfully elicited and introduced evidence of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction. On the cross-examination, the 
following exchange took place: 
Defendant: He never even told me what I was being 
arrested for, actually. 
Prosecutor: Okay. 
Defendant: I found out in jail. 
Prosecutor: But you did tell the officer that you 
had a prior conviction for meth? Seven 
years -
Defendant: No, 1 did not. I never did. No. It's 
nothing I brag about.1 
(R. 210:210:12-17). Defense counsel immediately objected, arguing 
that the State's reference to Ms. Reddish's prior criminal 
XA true and correct copy of the transcript containing the 
exchange, the argument of counsel, and the trial court's ruling is 
attached hereto as Addendum B. 
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conviction for possession of meth was improper under Rule 404(b) 
of the Utah Rules of Evidence (R. 210:210-11; 210:213-14). 
Further, defense counsel argued that the probative value did not 
outweigh the prejudicial effect of such a damaging reference (R. 
210:211:14-20). 
The trial court, after entertaining argument, ruled that the 
State's reference to the prior drug conviction of Ms. Reddish was 
admissible because it goes to the intent of Ms. Reddish to possess 
the controlled substances found in her car (R. 210:215-16). 
Additionally, the trial court concluded that "the probative value 
on the intent issue rises above the level of the prejudicial 
issue." (R. 210:215-16) . 
Under the first part of the test, the trial court abused its 
discretion by admitting evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior conviction 
for possession of meth. The record demonstrates that evidence of 
Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction was not offered for a non-
character purpose. Other than the cryptic reference by the State 
to the prior conviction on cross-examination, there was no 
discussion or evidence taken by the trial court concerning the 
surrounding circumstances or similarities between the prior drug 
conviction and the drug charges in the instant case. 
Consequently, the State all but failed to demonstrate a nexus 
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between the prior drug conviction and the alleged charges of 
possession of controlled substances and drug paraphernalia. 
Moreover, the prior drug conviction some six or seven years 
ago does not satisfy the requirements of Utah Rule of Evidence 
402. According to Rule 402, "[e]vidence which is not relevant is 
not admissible." Utah R. Evid. 4 02. "xRelevant evidence' means 
evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact 
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more 
probable or less probable than it would be without the evidence." 
Utah R. Evid. 401. "Other crime evidence is admissible if it 
'tends to prove some fact that is material to the crime charged--
other than the defendant's propensity to commit crime.'" Bluff, 
2002 UT 66 at f56. 
The record demonstrates that the evidence of Ms. Reddish's 
prior drug conviction was less than probative of any material fact 
to the crimes charged. Other than propensity to commit the crime, 
evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction did not tend to 
prove a material fact of the crimes charged. Due to the total 
lack of evidence concerning the facts and circumstances of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction, there were no similarities 
between Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction and the alleged drug 
related charges in the instant case. 
14 
Finally, the trial court erred by concluding that the 
evidence of Ms. Reddish's prior drug conviction met the 
requirements of Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. In State 
v. Shickles, 760 P.2d 291 (Utah 1995), the Utah Supreme Court 
stated: 
In deciding whether the danger of unfair 
prejudice and the like substantially 
outweighs the incremental probative value, a 
variety of matters must be considered, 
including the strength of the evidence as to 
the commission of the other crime, the 
similarities between the crimes, the interval 
of time that has elapsed between the crimes, 
the need for the evidence, the efficacy of 
alternative proof, and the degree to which 
the evidence probably will rouse the jury to 
overmastering hostility. 
Id. at 295-96 (quoting E. Cleary, McCormick on Evidence § 190, at 
565 (3d ed. 1984)); see also Utah R. Evid. 403.2 
Ms. Reddish admitted as much when confronted on cross-
examination by the State concerning the prior drug conviction. 
However, the conclusiveness of having a prior drug conviction for 
possession of meth increased the likelihood that the jury would 
and did convict Ms. Reddish based on her criminal character or 
propensity to commit bad acts. 
2Utah Rule of Evidence 403 provides: "Although relevant, 
evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the 
issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, 
waste of time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence." 
15 
The trial court failed to consider the similarities, if any, 
between the crimes. Moreover, the trial court failed to consider 
the lack of proximity between the crimes or how the interval-of-
time factor might affect the Rule 403 analysis. 
The need for the evidence as well as the efficacy of 
alternative proof was extremely low in the instant case. For 
example, the State, at trial, presented evidence of a bag 
allegedly found in Ms. Reddish's car, which contained controlled 
substances and drug paraphernalia. In short, the evidence of Ms. 
Reddish's prior drug conviction was unnecessary to the State's 
case, especially when considered in light of the danger of unfair 
prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury based 
solely on Ms. Reddish's criminal character or propensity to commit 
bad acts. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY FAILING TO DETERMINE 
ON THE RECORD THE ACCURACY OF CONTESTED 
INFORMATION CONTAINED IN THE PRESENTENCE 
INVESTIGATION REPORT. 
According to Utah law, it is well-established that "any 
alleged inaccuracies in the presentence investigation report, 
which have not been resolved by the parties and the department 
prior to sentencing, shall be brought to the attention of the 
sentencing judge. . . ." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) 
(Supp. 2005); State v. Maroney, 2004 UT App 206, %26, 94 P.3d 295. 
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"Whether the trial court properly complied with a legal duty to 
resolve on the record the accuracy of contested information in 
sentencing reports is a question of law that [the appellate court] 
review[s] for correctness." State v. Veteto, 2000 UT 62, fl3, 6 
P.3d 1133. 
A. Duty to Consider Objections 
As a matter of compliance, Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (a), 
"requires the sentencing judge to consider the party's objections 
to the report, make findings on the record as to whether the 
information objected to is accurate, and determine on the record 
whether that information is relevant to the issue of sentencing." 
State v. Jaeger, 1999 UT 1, [^44, 973 P. 2d 404; State v. Maroney, 
2004 UT App 206, H26, 94 P.3d 295. Nevertheless, "if a party 
fails to challenge the accuracy of the presentence investigation 
report at the time of sentencing, that matter shall be considered 
to be waived." See Utah Code Ann. § 77-18-1(6) (b) . 
B. Failure of Sentencing Judge to Consider Objections 
The record demonstrates that the trial court failed to duly 
consider the inaccuracy set forth in the presentence investigation 
report. Ms. Reddish objected to the presentence investigation, 
disputing the report's accuracy concerning the 11/26/83 conviction 
for possession / use of a controlled substance (03/17/05 
Sentencing Transcript, pp. 34-35). 
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After alerting the trial court to the inaccuracy, the trial 
court failed to duly consider the information or make findings on 
the record as to whether the information objected to by Ms. 
Reddish was accurate. Further, the trial court failed to make a 
determination on the record of whether the information was 
relevant to the issue of sentencing. 
III. APPOINTED TRIAL COUNSEL DENIED MS. REDDISH OF 
HER SIXTH AMENDMENT RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE 
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BY FAILING TO REQUEST 
THAT THE TRIAL COURT UTILIZE ITS FACT FINDING 
FUNCTION TO RESOLVE THE INACCURACY. 
The United States Supreme Court, in Strickland v. Washington, 
466 U.S. 668, 104 S.Ct 2052 (1984), established a two-prong test 
for determining when a defendant's Sixth Amendment3 right to 
effective assistance of counsel has been denied. Id. at 687, 104 
S.Ct. at 2064. This test - adopted by Utah courts - requires a 
defendant to show "first, that his counsel rendered a deficient 
performance in some demonstrable manner, which performance fell 
below an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment 
and, second, that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant." 
Bundy v. Deland, 763 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988); State v. Perry, 
899 P.2d 1232, 1239 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); State v. Wright, 893 
3The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution states in 
relevant part that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall 
enjoy the right . . . to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence." 
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P.2d 1113, 1119 (Utah Ct. App. 1995). MT] he right to the 
effective assistance of counsel is recognized not for its own 
sake, but because of the effect it has on the ability of the 
accused to receive a fair trial," or, in this case, a fair 
sentencing. Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 369, 113 S.Ct. 
838, 842, (1993). 
To satisfy the first prong of the test, a defendant must 
w
'identify the acts or omissions' which, under the circumstances, 
'show that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness.'" State v. Templin, 805 P.2d 182, 186 
(Utah 1990) (quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 688, 104 S.Ct. 
at 2066, 2064 (footnotes omitted)). A defendant must "overcome 
the strong presumption that trial counsel rendered adequate 
assistance and exercised reasonable professional judgment." State 
v. Bullock, 791 P.2d 155, 159-60 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 497 
U.S. 1024, 110 S.Ct. 3270 (1990). 
To show prejudice under the second prong of the test, a 
defendant must proffer sufficient evidence to support "a 
reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceedings would have been different." 
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694, 104 S.Ct. at 2068; Templin, 805 P.2d 
at 187. UA reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to 
undermine confidence in the outcome." Strickland, 466 U.S. at 
19 
695, 104 S.Ct. at 2069; Parsons v. Barnes, 871 P. 2d 516, 522 (Utah 
1994); State v. Frame, 723 P.2d 401, 405 (Utah 1986). 
Appointed trial counsel's failure to request that the trial 
court utilize its fact finding function to resolve the inaccuracy 
in the presentence investigation report fell below an objective 
standard of reasonable professional judgment. This is 
demonstrated by existing Utah case law, the plain language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-18-1 (6) (a) , and the underlying factual 
circumstances of this case. 
But for counsel's unprofessional error of failing to request 
that the trial court utilize its fact finding function, the result 
at sentencing would have been different. By alerting the trial 
court of its obligation, the trial court more likely than not 
would have duly considered the inaccuracy set forth in the 
presentence investigation report, which, in turn, would have 
allowed it to more fully the matters presented during sentencing. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Ms. Reddish respectfully requests 
that this Court reverse her convictions and remand the case to the 
20 
district court for further proceedings consistent with this 
Court's instructions as set forth in its opinion. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22 day of December, 2005. 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, SCOTT L WIGGINS, hereby certify that I personally caused 
to be hand-delivered two (2) true and correct copies of the 
foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT to the following on this //_ day of 
December, 2005: 
Mr. J. Frederic Voros, Jr. 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South, 6th Floor 
P.O. Box l^&S^A 
Salt Lakef^CityAm 8^114-0854 
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MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
P.O. Box 618 
800 West State Street 
Farmington, Utah 84025 
Telephone: (801)451-4300 
Fax: (801)451-4328 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF DAVIS, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 
SHARON KAY REDDISH 
DOB: 03/15/1965, 
Defendant. 
AMENDED 
INFORMATION 
Case No. 041700875 
The undersigned prosecutor states on information and belief that the defendant, 
either directly or as a party, on or about May 20, 2004 at County of Davis, State of Utah, 
committed the crimes of: 
COUNT 1 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (581) 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, second degree felony, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the 
defendant having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit 
methamphetamine. 
COUNT 2 
POSSESSION OR USE OF A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (PRIOR), (584) 
58-37-8(2)(a)(i) UCA, class A misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the 
defendant having been previously convicted of Unlawful Possession or Use of a Controlled 
Substance, did knowingly and intentionally possess or use a controlled substance; to wit 
marijuana. 
FILED 
JAN 2 h 2005 
SECOND 
DISTRICT COURT I 
COUNT 3 
POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA, (92) 58-37a-5(l) UCA, class B 
misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the defendant did knowingly, 
intentionally or recklessly use, or possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, 
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, 
test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a 
controlled substance into the human body. 
COUNT 4 
DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALCOHOL AND/OR DRUGS, 
(1171) 41-6-44 UCA, class B misdemeanor, as follows: That at the time and place aforesaid the 
defendant did operate or was in actual physical control of a vehicle, and was under the influence 
of alcohol, any drug, or the combined influence of alcohol and any drug to a degree which 
rendered the defendant incapable of safely operating a vehicle. 
This information is based on evidence obtained from witness Cory Galbraith. 
Authorized this Z ^ f e y of T T ^ 2005 
for presentment and filing: 
MELVIN C. WILSON 
Davis County Attorney 
Deputy Davis County Attorney 
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1 Q And it's not true that you told the officer that 
2 the money was yours from seven years ago? 
3 A Uh-huh. [affirmative]. That's right. Seven years 
4 before, meaning what? 
5 Q That the money was, was in the bag from seven years 
6 prior? 
7 A No. But, what's that mean? 
8 Q I don't know. But he didn't state that? You 
9 didn't state that? 
10 A We didn't this conversation that he said we had. 
11 Q Okay. 
12 A He never even told me what I was being arrested 
13 for, actually. 
14 Q Okay. 
15 A I found out in jail. 
16 Q But you did tell the officer that you had a prior 
17 conviction for meth? Seven years -
18 A No, I did not. I never did. No. It's nothing I 
19 brag about. 
20 MR. DRAGE: Your Honor, I would object to that as 
21 well. 
22 THE COURT: Ladies and gentlemen. There is a legal 
23 issue which the Court has to resolve at this point. 
24 Sometimes these legal issues need to be resolved outside the 
25 presence of the jury and the reason for that is that the 
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1 resolution of the issue relates to facts, some of which may 
2 be admissible and some of which may not. That's why we ask 
3 the jury to step outside. So, we're going to excuse you to 
4 go back to the jury room, we'll take care of the legal issue 
5 then, and invite you back. 
6 Please stand, ladies and gentlemen. 
7 (Whereupon the jury left the courtroom) 
8 THE COURT: Please be seated. 
9 Mr. Drage? 
10 MR. DRAGE: Yes, Your Honor. My objection is to 
11 reference in regard to her prior criminal conviction for, I 
12 believe it was a felony possession of methamphetamine. Now 
13 the objection is that it's an improper reference to a prior 
14 bad act. As a result of that the probative value is not, 
15 does not out way the prejudicial affect whereby, I believe 
16 the jury would probably say, "Once a user, always a user," 
17 and may improperly convict her based upon conduct that 
18 occurred seven years ago as opposed to conduct - six years 
19 ago, as opposed to conduct which occurs on this May 20th 
20 2004. 
21 THE COURT: All right, Mr. Poll, please? 
22 MR. POLL: Yes, Your Honor. First of all, with 
23 regard to 404B I believe that it is admissible because under 
24 404B it's an exception to excluding prior bad acts and 
25 convictions is intent and the defense has placed that in 
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1 issue in their opening statement. I think that at least 
2 bolstered by Ms. Reddish's testimony to this point that she 
3 was innocently in the proximity of the drugs, that she did 
4 not have any intent to possess those drug items, and that she 
5 did not have - well, she frankly just did not have the mens 
6 rea or intent and therefore, 404B is an inclusive doctrine 
7 that allows us to bring in those prior bad acts. Also, the 
8 fact that there is a conviction bolsters that as opposed to 
9 just a bad act. We have an actual conviction. 
10 Further, the defendant made the statements to the 
11 officer. Now, she can deny that she made them but she, a 
12 defendant has to be, I guess, responsible for the statements 
13 that they make and that based upon the principal that 
14 admissions by a party opponent are admissible. So I can at 
15 least ask her about her statements. But I think I can also 
16 ask her about whether the conviction actually occurred based 
17 on 404B and the fact that defense counsel also brought up 
18 these issues, not once, not twice, but several times with the 
19 officer while he was on the stand and continued along those 
20 line of questioning about their conversation about her prior 
21 meth use five, six, or seven years ago and her prior 
22 conviction. So, I think the door is open as well. 
23 MS. REDDISH: Can I address the court? 
24 THE COURT: No, ma'am. You can't. 
25 In connection with your comment, counsel, if it's 
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1 true that on cross examination you can inquire the 
2 conversation that a defendant may have with a police officer, 
3 but that conversation has to be measured and looked at in 
4 light of 404B, if indeed it deals with bad acts. And I 
5 understand that you're seeking this testimony based upon the 
6 exception to 404 which in effect deals with intent, which is 
7 part of the issues, part of the elements of this case. Is 
8 I that correct? 
9 MR. POLL: That's correct. 
10 THE COURT: Counsel, do you wish to respond? 
11 MR. DRAGE: Yes, Your Honor. Briefly. I'll start 
12 first with the statements that she has said, or what's she's 
13 alleged to have said and she has already denied those. So 
14 we've satisfied that purpose. As far as my inquiry with the 
15 officer as to what their conversation was, the officer did 
16 make reference to use. He never made reference to the actual 
17 conviction. So he said she said this, she used five years, 
18 six years, seven years ago, but never mentioned the word 
19 conviction, whether the officer meant to or not. 
20 THE COURT: Well, interestingly, 404B, in terms of 
21 prior bad acts doesn't require a conviction. 
22 MR. DRAGE: Correct. And then, I guess that's my 
23 next point, Your Honor. 404B, there is an exception, yes. 
24 And the court first has to find and Brandon has delineated 
25 that as being an exception. But then the next step is, we do 
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have an exception but the court then, on its final step, has 
to weigh does the properative value - Brandon's argument is 
does the probative value showing intent outweigh the 
prejudicial value. And I would argue no, that it's 
prejudicial, that it's the fear that the jury will convict 
her based upon prior use, conviction or not, as opposed to 
impartially deciding on the events that happened on May 20th 
of 2004. So I would argue that there is the exception we 
acknowledge and recognize that being an exception. But there 
is the final problem which is to weigh the probative versus 
the prejudicial value. 
THE COURT: Alright, thank you. Counsel, as I 
understand the 404B application, there are three elements 
that the court must consider. The first element is whether 
or not the particular prior bad act, conviction or not, falls 
within one of the exceptions. One of the exceptions is 
intent and in this case given the context in which the issue 
arises, intent is a very real issue. The Court therefore 
finds that the exception would apply. 
The next point of inquiry is whether or not the 
testimony dealing with the exception is, in fact, relevant 
and in this case the relevancy is very real because it would 
help the finder of fact to determine whether or not the 
alleged drugs or the drugs that were found in the vehicle 
were drugs there for the purpose of use and was intended to 
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1 be used by the defendant. Therefore, it is certainly 
2 relevant. 
3 Then based upon 403 of the Rules of Evidence the 
4 court must determine, even though it falls within the 
5 exception, and even though it's relevant, the court must 
6 balance the properative value of the testimony against the 
7 prejudicial value. In this case what we have is a situation 
8 where the defendant's vehicle was stopped. Ultimately after 
9 certain investigations were conducted by the police officer, 
10 the car was searched and a blue, I'll call it a bag, was 
11 found in which there were numerous items of drugs, namely, 
12 methamphetamine and marijuana. In addition there was drug 
13 paraphernalia. The question then becomes whether or not the 
14 information contained within the car was information which 
15 the defendant in this case intended to use or based upon the 
16 charges pending, intended to possess. Because whether she 
17 possessed them or used them, either one would fit that 
18 element of the charge. Intent becomes very significant. We 
19 have in this case, I understand, a denial of that on the part 
20 of the defendant and also a witness that I understand is 
21 going to testify claiming that the particular bag belonged to 
22 another person other than the defendant who was the only one 
23 present that night and the bag was behind the driver's seat 
24 in her car. Therefore, evidence that deals with her intent, 
25 in the court's view, is significantly important. And given 
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for reasons that I've indicated because the probative value 
is greater than the prejudicial value. Based thereon, the 
court therefore overrules the objection and will allow the 
evidence in. 
But I hasten to point out that when the jury comes 
back in, I will advise them that I have overruled the 
objection. But I will caution the jury by way of legal 
instruction that they are to use the testimony relative to 
any prior conviction only on the issue as to whether or not 
the defendant intended the use with respect to the point in 
time that is now of issue. For any other reason, it's not to 
be considered by the jury. 
Any further comment from either side? 
MR. POLL: They'll be instructed that intent as to 
use or possession at the time? 
THE COURT: At the time and for no other purpose. 
MR. POLL: No further questions. 
THE COURT: [inaudible] 
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DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
SHARON KAYE REDDISH, 
Defendant. 
Custody: Bail 
MINUTES 
SENTENCING 
SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITMENT 
Case No: 041700875 FS 
Judge: DARWIN C. HANSEN 
Date: March 31, 2005 
PRESENT 
Clerk: glendap 
Prosecutor: POLL, BRANDON L 
Defendant 
Defendants Attorney(s) : ARRINGTON, C MARKLEY 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Date of birth: March 15, 1965 
Video 
Tape Number: 3/31/05 Tape Count: 10.39&10.50 
CHARGES 
1. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - 2nd Degree Felony 
Plea: Not: Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty 
2. ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE - Class A Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty 
3. USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG PARAPHERNALIA - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty 
4. DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE OF ALC/DRUGS - Class B Misdemeanor 
Plea: Not Guilty - Disposition: 01/25/2005 Guilty 
Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J 
JD18388813 
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Case No: 041700875 
Date: Mar 31, 2005 
HEARING 
The Court appoints Attorney Scott Wiggins for the defendant's 
appeal. The defendant's Motion to Review the Motion to Disqualify 
is denied. 
The defendant requests to be sent to the prison. The request is 
denied. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints SCOTT L WIGGINS to 
represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: SCOTT L WIGGINS 
Address: 57 W 200 S STE 105 
City: SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
Phone: (801)328-4333 
SENTENCE PRISON 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to an indeterminate term of not less than one year nor 
more than fifteen years in the Utah State Prison. 
The prison term is suspended. 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a 2nd Degree Felony, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 365 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The 
total time suspended for this charge is 365 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of USE OR POSSESSION OF DRUG 
PARAPHERNALIA a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to 
a term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time 
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Date: Mar 31, 2005 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
Based on the defendant's conviction of DRIVING UNDER THE INFLUENCE 
OF ALC/DRUGS a Class B Misdemeanor, the defendant is sentenced to a 
term of 180 day(s) in the Davis County Jail. The total time 
suspended for this charge is 180 day(s). 
SENTENCE JAIL RELEASE TIME NOTE 
The defendant may be released to an in-patient substance abuse 
program after having served at least 90 days. 
SENTENCE FINE 
Charge # 1 Fine: $10000.00 
Suspended: $8500.00 
Surcharge: $702.70 
Due: $1500.00 
Charge # 2 Fine: 
Suspended: 
Due: 
$2500. 
$2500. 
$0.00 
00 
00 
Charge # 3 Fine: $1850.00 
Suspended: $1850.00 
Due: $0.00 
Charge # 4 Fine: $1850.00 
Suspended: $1850.00 
Due: $0.00 
Total Fine: $16200.00 
Total Suspended: $14700.00 
Total Surcharge: $702.70 
Total Principal Due: $1500.00 
Plus Interest 
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Date: Mar 31, 2005 
ORDER OF PROBATION 
The defendant is placed on probation for 3 year(s). 
Probation is to be supervised by Adult Probation & Parole. 
Defendant to serve 180 day(s) jail. 
Defendant is to report to the Davis County Jail. 
Defendant is to pay a fine of 1500.00 which includes the surcharge, 
Interest may increase the final amount due. 
PROBATION CONDITIONS 
CONDUCT: Commit no further violations of the law. 
DRUGS: Do not use or possess controlled substance or be in the 
presence of those who use, possess or distribute controlled 
substances. 
TESTING: Submit to body fluids testing for evidence of drug or 
alcohol use. 
EVALUATION: Evaluation by Davis County Alcohol and Drug or Davis 
County Behavioral Health and successful completion of any program 
that they suggest. 
PROGRAM/TREATMENT: Enter, participate in and complete any program, 
counseling or treatment as directed by AP&P. 
SEARCH CONSENT: Submit to search of person, premises or vehicle 
and seizure of any evidence without a search warrant at the request 
of police or probation officer, if they have reasonable cause. 
AP&P CONDITIONS: Complete any other terms or conditions or 
probation as required by AP&P and sign a probation agreement. 
Complete DNA testing and pay the fee. 
Dated this ¥• day of 
.WIN C. 
District Court Judge 
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B- Adult Record: 
Date Agency 
11-26-83 Davis Co. S.O. 
Offense 
Poss/UseofC/S 
Disposition 
Convicted, 30 days 
confinement, $106 fine 
06-01-98 Davis Co. S.O. Illegal Poss/Use of C/S 
Third Degree Felony; 
Illegal Poss/Use of C/S, 
Class B Misd. 
Convicted, 18 mos 
probation, $185 fine 
05-21-04 Clearfield P.D. 
C. Pending Cases: 
Illegal Poss/use of C/S, 
Second Degree Felony; 
Illegal Poss/Use of C/S, 
Class A Misd; 
Poss of Para, 
Class B Misd; 
Driving Under Influence 
And/or Drugs, 
Class B Misd. 
Current offense 
The defendant denied having any other pending matters. 
D. Gang Affiliations: 
The defendant denied having been affiliated with any street gangs. 
E. Probation/Parole History: 
The defendant denied having been placed on supervised probation as a juvenile. Records of the 
Utah Juvenile Court failed to reveal a supervision history. Ms. Reddish denied having been on 
supervised probation as an adult. A check with records of Adult Probation and Parole failed to 
reveal a supervision history for the defendant in Utah. 
VICTIM IMPACT STATEMENT/RESTITUTION: 
There ai-e no victims identified in this matter and no restitution is owing. 
